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Bali Action Plan 
14 December 2007 
 
United Nations Climate Change Conference, Bali 
 
 
The Conference of the Parties, 
 
Resolving to urgently enhance implementation of the Convention in 
order to achieve its ultimate objective in full accordance with its 
principles and commitments, 
 
Reaffirming that economic and social development and poverty 
eradication are global priorities, 
 
Responding to the findings of the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that warming of the 
climate system is unequivocal, and that delay in reducing emissions 
significantly constrains opportunities to achieve lower stabilization 
levels and increases the risk of more severe climate change impacts, 
 
Recognizing that deep cuts in global emissions will be required to achieve 
the ultimate objective of the Convention and emphasizing the urgency 
to address climate change as indicated in the Fourth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
 
1) Decides to launch a comprehensive process to enable the full, 
effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through 
long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012, in order 
to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a decision at its fifteenth 
session, by addressing, inter alia: 
 
a) A shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a 
long-term global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the 
ultimate objective of the Convention, in accordance with the 
provisions and principles of the Convention, in particular the 
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principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, and taking into account social and 
economic conditions and other relevant factors; 
 
b) Enhanced national/international action on mitigation of climate 
change, including, inter alia, consideration of: 
 
i) Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate 
mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified 
emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all 
developed country Parties, while ensuring the comparability 
of efforts among them, taking into account differences in 
their national circumstances; 
 
ii) Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing 
country Parties in the context of sustainable development, 
supported and enabled by technology, financing and 
capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable 
manner; 
 
iii) Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating 
to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries; and the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries; 
 
iv) Cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, 
in order to enhance implementation of Article 4, paragraph 
1(c), of the Convention; 
 
v) Various approaches, including opportunities for using 
markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to 
promote, mitigation actions, bearing in mind different 
circumstances of developed and developing countries; 
 
vi) Economic and social consequences of response measures; 
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vii) Ways to strengthen the catalytic role of the Convention in 
encouraging multilateral bodies, the public and private 
sectors and civil society, building on synergies among 
activities and processes, as a means to support mitigation in 
a coherent and integrated manner; 
 
c) Enhanced action on adaptation, including, inter alia, 
consideration of: 
 
i) International cooperation to support urgent implementation 
of adaptation actions, including through vulnerability 
assessments, prioritization of actions, financial needs 
assessments, capacity-building and response strategies, 
integration of adaptation actions into sectoral and national 
planning, specific projects and programmes, means to 
incentivize the implementation of adaptation actions, and 
other ways to enable climate-resilient development and 
reduce vulnerability of all Parties, taking into account the 
urgent and immediate needs of developing countries that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change, especially the least developed countries and small 
island developing States, and further taking into account the 
needs of countries in Africa affected by drought, 
desertification and floods; 
 
ii) Risk management and risk reduction strategies, including 
risk sharing and transfer mechanisms such as insurance; 
 
iii) Disaster reduction strategies and means to address loss and 
damage associated with climate change impacts in 
developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change; 
 
iv) Economic diversification to build resilience; 
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v) Ways to strengthen the catalytic role of the Convention in 
encouraging multilateral bodies, the public and private 
sectors and civil society, building on synergies among 
activities and processes, as a means to support adaptation in 
a coherent and integrated manner; 
 
d) Enhanced action on technology development and transfer to 
support action on mitigation and adaptation, including, inter 
alia, consideration of: 
 
i) Effective mechanisms and enhanced means for the removal 
of obstacles to, and provision of financial and other 
incentives for, scaling up of the development and transfer of 
technology to developing country Parties in order to 
promote access to affordable environmentally sound 
technologies; 
 
ii) Ways to accelerate deployment, diffusion and transfer of 
affordable environmentally sound technologies; 
 
iii) Cooperation on research and development of current, new 
and innovative technology, including win-win solutions; 
 
iv) The effectiveness of mechanisms and tools for technology 
cooperation in specific sectors; 
 
e) Enhanced action on the provision of financial resources and 
investment to support action on mitigation and adaptation and 
technology cooperation, including, inter alia, consideration of: 
 
i) Improved access to adequate, predictable and sustainable 
financial resources and financial and technical support, and 
the provision of new and additional resources, including 
official and concessional funding for developing country 
Parties; 
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ii) Positive incentives for developing country Parties for the 
enhanced implementation of national mitigation strategies 
and adaptation action; 
 
iii) Innovative means of funding to assist developing country 
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
impacts of climate change in meeting the cost of adaptation; 
 
iv) Means to incentivize the implementation of adaptation 
actions on the basis of sustainable development policies; 
 
v) Mobilization of public- and private-sector funding and 
investment, including facilitation of carbon-friendly 
investment choices; 
 
vi) Financial and technical support for capacity-building in the 
assessment of the costs of adaptation in developing 
countries, in particular the most vulnerable ones, to aid in 
determining their financial needs; 
 
2) Decides that the process shall be conducted under a subsidiary body 
under the Convention, hereby established and known as the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention, that shall complete its work in 2009 and present the 
outcome of its work to the Conference of the Parties for adoption at 
its fifteenth session; 
 
3) Agrees that the process shall begin without delay, that the sessions 
of the group will be scheduled as often as is feasible and necessary to 
complete the work of the group, where possible in conjunction with 
sessions of other bodies established under the Convention, and that 
its sessions may be complemented by workshops and other activities, 
as required; 
 
4) Decides that the first session of the group shall be held as soon as is 
feasible and not later than April 2008; 
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5) Decides that the Chair and Vice-Chair of the group, with one being 
from a Party included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Party) 
and the other being from a Party not included in Annex I to the 
Convention (non-Annex I Party), shall alternate annually between 
an Annex I Party and a non-Annex I Party; 
 
6) Takes note of the proposed schedule of meetings contained in the 
annex; 
 
7) Instructs the group to develop its work programme at its first session 
in a coherent and integrated manner; 
 
8) Invites Parties to submit to the secretariat, by 22 February 2008, 
their views regarding the work programme, taking into account the 
elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, to be compiled by the 
secretariat for consideration by the group at its first meeting; 
 
9) Requests the group to report to the Conference of the Parties at its 
fourteenth session on progress made; 
 
10) Agrees to take stock of the progress made, at its fourteenth session, 
on the basis of the report by the group; 
 
11) Agrees that the process shall be informed by, inter alia, the best 
available scientific information, experience in implementation of the 
Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, and processes thereunder, 
outputs from other relevant intergovernmental processes and 
insights from the business and research communities and civil 
society; 
 
12) Notes that the organization of work of the group will require a 
significant amount of additional resources to provide for the 
participation of delegates from Parties eligible to be funded and to 
provide conference services and substantive support; 
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13) Strongly urges Parties in a position to do so, in order to facilitate the 
work of the group, to provide contributions to the Trust Fund for 
Participation in the UNFCCC Process and the Trust Fund for 
Supplementary Activities for the purposes referred to in paragraph 
12 above and to provide other forms of in kind support such as 
hosting a session of the group. 
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The Bali Roadmap and Beyond: Opportunities for 
Australia 
 
Professor Robyn Eckersley 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The thirteenth conference of the parties (COP) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Nusa 
Dua, Bali on 3-15 December, 2007 marked a geopolitical realignment in 
the global politics of climate change.  However, whether this will turn 
out to be a subtle or seismic shift remains to be seen.  For Australia, the 
Rudd government’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol will serve as the 
defining moment between ‘before’ and ‘after’ in Australia’s international 
stance on climate change.  The Howard years (1996-2007) represent the 
‘before’, marked by unapologetic nationalist bargaining at Kyoto in 
1997 followed by a loyal alignment with the Bush administration’s 
refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  The ‘after’ under a Rudd Labor 
government spells the end of the US-Australian ‘coalition of the 
unwilling’ and Australia’s re-engagement with environmental 
multilateralism.   
 
The Labor Party had chosen climate change as one of the small handful 
of policies on which it distinguished itself from the Coalition during the 
2007 election campaign.  This policy stance capitalised on growing 
public concern and media interest in climate change in Australia arising 
from a confluence of developments: the popularity of Al Gore’s movie 
An Inconvenient Truth, the publication of the Stern Review on the 
Economic Costs of Climate Change (Stern 2007), the release of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth 
Assessment Report in 2007 and an unprecedented drought in Australia.  
The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the IPCC and Al Gore on 10 
December 2007 (coinciding with the Bali meeting) helped to seal the 
international consensus on the science of climate change and marginalise 
the climate skeptics that had played a dominant role in John Howard’s 
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cabinet.  However, apart from the Labor Party’s promise to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol, and its decision to commission Professor Ross Garnaut 
to undertake a study on the economic costs of climate change for 
Australia, the differences in the core domestic climate change policies of 
the two major parties during the election campaign were not especially 
stark.  Both promised a national cap-and-trade system but declined to 
announce the targets, and both promised a national renewable energy 
target – although Labor’s target of 20% was confined to renewable 
energy sources whereas the Coalition’s 15% ‘clean energy target’ 
included ‘clean coal’.   
 
More significantly for the international negotiations, during the election 
campaign John Howard had boxed Labor into a corner after Labor’s 
shadow minister for the environment, Peter Garrett, declared that a 
Labor government would sign a Kyoto successor treaty regardless of 
whether China or the US signed (ABC News 2007).  John Howard 
declared during the campaign this was a policy to ‘reduce Australian 
jobs’, not emissions (News.com.au 2007).   This tactic precipitated so-
called ‘crisis talks’ between Kevin Rudd and Peter Garrett, which 
resulted in Garrett issuing a statement of ‘clarification’ that declared 
‘Appropriate developing country commitments for the post-2012 
commitment period ... would be an essential pre-requisite for Australian 
support’ (News.com.au 2007).  However, it was clear that both the US 
and China were opposed to mandatory targets, which raised the crucial 
question of what other types of developing country commitments might 
satisfy a Labor government’s test of ‘appropriateness’.  
 
Kyoto Symbolism 
 
Prime Minister Rudd was only one of six heads of state to attend the 
Bali gathering, which included representatives from 187 countries.  This 
presence reinforced the symbolic shift in the geopolitical landscape of 
climate change while also affording the new Rudd government an 
opportunity to establish ties with Indonesia and East Timor.  The 
rapturous applause received by the Australian delegation at the 
conference plenary following the ratification announcement intensified 
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the US’s isolation as the only significant developed country outside the 
Kyoto club, placing it under increasing international and domestic 
pressure to play a more proactive and multilateral role in the Bali 
negotiations.   
 
Yet Australia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was hardly heroic, as 
it would be for the US.  Australia enjoys the second most generous 
target of all the countries listed in Annex I – an 8% increase from a 1990 
baseline.1   Even under the Howard government, Australia was more or 
less on track to meet this target by the Kyoto commitment period of 
2008-2012, aided by the inflated baseline provided by the so-called 
‘Australia clause’ in the Protocol, which enables Australia to include 
reduced emissions from land clearing in its emissions calculations.2  
According to the Australian Greenhouse Office, Australia’s emissions are 
projected to be around 109% by 2008-12 (Australian Government 2007).  
In contrast, the Clinton-Gore administration had negotiated at Kyoto a 
much more challenging cut of 7%, which the US Senate rejected, the 
Bush administration repudiated and any successor administration will 
find difficult to approach. US emissions had already grown by 20% by 
2003 (World Bank 2007). The most radical climate bill presented to 
Congress to date – Democrat Henry Waxman’s Safe Climate Act 2007 
(H.R. 1590) – merely seeks to return US emissions to 1990 levels by 
2020.3   
 
However, Australia’s easy ride will be short-lived.  The Australian 
Greenhouse Office (2007) estimates Australia’s emissions will climb to 
127% by 2020 from a 1990 baseline, which presents Australia with a 
much bigger challenge in the post-Kyoto commitment period. 
 
The Bali Challenge 
 
The primary purpose of the Bali meeting was to develop an action plan 
or ‘roadmap’ for the negotiation of a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, 
due to expire in 2012.  The IPCC has warned that global emissions must 
peak by 2015 and then decline by 80-90% by 2050 to prevent a 
dangerous warming of more than 2-2.4 degrees above pre-industrial 
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levels.  When set against these scientific recommendations, the Kyoto 
Protocol must be seen as merely a warm-up match, with modest 
emission reduction targets averaging only 5% by 2012, and restricted to 
the developed countries listed in Annex I.  The Kyoto successor will be 
the main game, and time will be of the essence.  The negotiations are 
scheduled to conclude by the end of 2009, in time for the fifteenth 
Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, to allow for the new treaty to 
come into legal force immediately after the expiry of the Kyoto 
commitment period in 2012.   
 
Two central challenges faced the negotiators at Bali. The first was to 
persuade developed countries to move towards much more robust 
targets in the post-Kyoto commitment period (2013-2020).  This entails 
moving from the Kyoto Protocol’s modest average target of 5% to a 
range of 25-40% as recommended by the IPCC (IPCC 2007, 776).  The 
second was to design appropriate incentives (including funding and 
technology transfer, and assistance with adaptation) to engage the 
developing world, especially major emerging emitters such as China and 
India, in effective mitigation efforts.  These two challenges were to 
become linked in the final dramatic day of the negotiations, which saw 
the most powerful state in the world continue to resist mandatory 
targets but succumb to intense pressure to join the consensus over a text 
full of compromises.    
 
Both the Bush administration and Howard government had joined 
forces in 2001 in arguing that the Kyoto Protocol was flawed because it 
exempted major emerging emitters from the developing world from any 
mandatory emissions reductions targets.   Yet their argument selectively 
focused only on future aggregate emissions and ignored the vast 
discrepancy in historical responsibility for emissions, capacity to absorb 
emission cuts and per capita carbon footprints between developed and 
developing countries.  This amounted to a rejection of the burden 
sharing principles of equity, ‘common but differentiated responsibility 
and capability’, Northern leadership and Northern assistance to the 
South that are embedded in the UNFCCC.4  These principles have been 
repeatedly reaffirmed by the parties to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
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Protocol, and China has led the G-77 in insisting that these principles 
continue to guide the negotiation of a successor to the Kyoto Protocol. 
While rapidly growing China is poised to overtake the US as the world’s 
biggest aggregate emitter, the Chinese per capita carbon footprint is 
only around one fourth of the US’s.  So while engaging China and other 
major emerging emitters from the developing world is crucial to the 
success of a post-Kyoto treaty, this engagement must be of a kind that 
provides sufficient development slack for these developing countries to 
address poverty and improve the welfare of their citizens relative to 
affluent countries. The Action Plan agreed to in Bali (UNFCCC 2007) 
continues this two track approach by explicitly endorsing the principles 
of the UNFCCC, including ‘the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (Paragraph 1(a)).  
 
The Bali Compromise 
 
On the crucial issue of targets for developed countries, the European 
Union (EU) took the lead in pushing for a 30% cut below 1990 levels by 
2020, which sat comfortably within the IPCC’s recommended reduction 
target range for developed countries of 25-40%.  However, the US 
strongly opposed a commitment to specific targets of any kind, and was 
widely regarded as the biggest ‘spoiler’ of the effort to construct a bold 
roadmap based on developed country leadership.  Australia, Canada, 
Russia and Japan – all long standing US allies in the climate change 
negotiations under the so-called Umbrella Group – also backed this 
refusal to commit to targets in the action plan.5  Australia argued that it 
could make no firm commitments to targets until it had considered the 
findings and recommendations of the Garnaut Report on the economic 
costs of climate change, expected around mid-2008.  However, it 
deviated from the US position in supporting the principle of ‘science-
based’ targets.  Moreover, three days before the final dramatic plenary, 
Prime Minister Rudd offered a not-so-veiled criticism of the US in a 
speech that declared that ‘all developed countries outside the Kyoto 
Protocol’ must ‘embrace comparable efforts’ (Wilkinson 2007).  By the 
final day of the conference, neither Australia nor any other of the US’s 
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traditional allies showed any overt support for the US’s hold out 
position on the text of the Action Plan.    
 
In lieu of specific interim targets, the final compromise in the Action 
Plan was an agreement to reach a decision by COP 15 on a ‘a long-term 
global goal for emissions reductions’ in accordance with the objectives 
and principles of the Convention (paragraph 1(a)), along with a 
paragraph in the preamble recognising that ‘deep cuts’ in emissions were 
required to achieve the UNFCCC’s ultimate objective.  Paragraph 11 of 
the Action Plan also declares that the negotiation process shall be 
informed by ‘the best available scientific information’ along with 
experience implementing the Kyoto Protocol, and insights from 
business, research communities and civil society.  In a mini-victory 
against the US, the preamble also footnoted the specific pages in the 
IPPC’s Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report, which 
enabled the IPCC’s range of 25-40% to re-enter the text via the back-
door (IPCC 2007, 39, 90 and 776).   
 
The compromise on the contentious issue of the balance of responsibility 
between developed and developing countries was contained in paragraph 
1b(i) and 1b(ii) (dubbed by the Australians as ‘the banana paragraphs’ 
after B1 and B2).  Sub-paragraph (b)(i) fell short of spelling out any 
specific targets for developed countries, but declared that they must 
address enhanced mitigation action including ‘measurable, reportable 
and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments, 
including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, while 
ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, taking into account 
differences in their national circumstances’.  Sub-paragraph (b)(ii) 
declared that developing countries would also be required to pursue 
‘enhanced, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation 
commitments’ but without any mention of quantified emission 
limitation and reduction objectives.  This sub-paragraph also included 
support and financing of technology and capacity building – all crucial 
provisions for developing countries. 
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Other key points of agreement in the Action Plan include support for 
reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries (which 
had not been included in the Kyoto Protocol), international cooperation 
to support adaptation (focusing particularly on the enhanced 
vulnerability of developing countries), technology development and 
transfer and enhanced action on financial resources and investment.   
Indeed, it was these latter provisions regarding North to South 
assistance that sparked some of the high drama on the final day as 
developing countries became increasingly frustrated with the US’s focus 
on forcing new commitments on developing countries at the expense of 
addressing developed country leadership responsibilities according to the 
principles of the UNFCCC.6  US defiance of its leadership responsibilities 
prompted a succession of critical speeches towards the US, culminating 
in a speech by Kevin Conrad from Papua New Guinea arguing that if 
the US did not wish to lead then it should get out of the way (Khor 
2007; Warren 2007).7  It was in the wake of the applause following this 
intervention that Paula Dobriansky, leader of the US delegation, 
announced that the US would join the consensus.   
 
Waiting for the Next US President 
 
However, the celebrations by many country delegations and 
environmental NGOs that followed the US’s face-saving capitulation 
must be understood in the context of the pessimism that had mounted in 
the gruelling, closing days of the conference.  For many environmental 
NGOs, the compromises in the Bali Action Plan failed to meet the larger 
challenge of climate change.  The flexible language in the Action Plan, 
which enabled the US to join the Bali consensus, artfully papered over 
key divisions concerning developed country targets and developing 
country commitments that surfaced during the tough negotiations and 
are likely to resurface for so long as the Bush administration remains in 
office.  The Kyoto Protocol gained international legitimacy as a very 
modest first step towards tackling the challenge of climate change, 
despite the nonparticipaion of the US (Eckersley 2007).  However, the 
success of the treaty for the next commitment period depends on the 
participation of the major emitters from the developed and developing 
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world, and above all, the US and China.  It is anticipated, or at least 
hoped, that a new US administration will break or at least soften some 
of the old deadlocks once it takes office in early 2009.   
 
The ground for a significant shift in US climate change policy is already 
underway at the municipal, state and national levels.  The November 
2006 Congressional elections, which delivered control of the Senate to 
the Democrats, have precipitated a new wave of ‘cap-and-trade’ climate 
change bills, which signal growing acceptance of a national emissions 
reduction target.  Many US states have already negotiated emissions 
trading schemes (in the North-East, California and, more recently, the 
Mid-West) and many US Mayors have joined an initiative to push for a 
more concerted national policy.  California’s Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger has enacted The Global Warming Solution Act 2006, 
which seeks to reduce California’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.  
Leading US corporations (including General Electric, BP and Alcoa) 
have formed a coalition with four major US environmental 
organisations, known as the US Climate Action Partnership, which has 
called for cuts in national aggregate carbon emissions of 10 to 30 percent 
over the next 15 years (USCAP 2007). Even Church groups have joined 
the call for climate action, including a campaign by the Evangelical 
Environmental Network called ‘What Would Jesus Drive?’8  
 
Despite these developments, climate change has not emerged as a major 
issue in the 2008 Presidential campaign, although the two leading 
Democrat Presidential candidates – Hilary Clinton and Barack Obama – 
have both backed a national cap-and-trade scheme and supported 
radical cuts in US emissions of 80% by 2050.  Senator John McCain is 
the only Republican Presidential candidate to show any support for a 
proactive climate change policy, with his pledge for a 60% cut in 
emissions by 2050.9  Yet it is still not clear whether a US Senate will 
muster the necessary two-thirds majority to support ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol or a successor treaty with strong developed country 
targets for the next commitment period in the recommended IPCC range 
in the absence of meaningful commitments by major developing 
countries.  This is likely to remain a sticking point. 
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Since the first COP in Berlin, the G77, led by China (and supported by 
the European Union), has resolutely argued that developing countries 
should not be expected to undertake any mandatory emissions 
reductions in the first commitment period.  At the second COP in 
Geneva, developing countries insisted that the Annex 1 countries should 
fulfil their commitments before the developing countries would consider 
undertaking any commitments (Hoffmann 2005, 175).  By the time of 
third COP at Kyoto, the China-led G77 position had hardened to the 
point of rejecting any language in the Protocol that referred even to 
voluntary commitments by developing countries to limit their emissions.  
Against this background, the Bali meeting represents a modest 
breakthrough insofar as developing countries have committed to 
mitigation measures for the first time.  However, these commitments 
remain undefined, do not extend to targets and are dependent on 
technology transfer and financing in ‘a measurable, reportable and 
verifiable manner’.   
 
The Bush administration’s strategy of saying to China ‘after you’ has 
been a recipe for stalemate.  Yet nor can China follow this tactic with 
the US indefinitely, given China’s greater relative vulnerability to the 
impacts of climate change.  The US must recognise that the success of 
China’s mitigation efforts will depend on continued leadership and 
assistance by developed countries.  
 
Australia as China-US Broker? 
 
Much has been made of Prime Minister Rudd’s fluency in Mandarin and 
his role as a potential broker between the US and China.  Australia has 
strong trading relations with China and it shares with China (and other 
developing countries) a greater vulnerability to the risks of climate 
change than the US or Europe.  Yet Australia also belongs to the group 
of developed countries (including the US, Canada and Japan) that have 
failed to curb their emissions growth (factoring out emissions from land 
clearing).  Despite these mutual sympathies, Australia is in no credible 
position to attempt to coax either the US or China into accepting targets 
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until such time as it decides its own national target, which is unlikely to 
be before it has reflected on the Garnaut Report.  By this time, the US 
Presidential race will be in full swing and the Bush administration in 
care-taker mode.  Yet the Rudd government’s postponement of a 
decision on Australia’s target might foreclose the possibility of Australia 
playing an early, proactive role in influencing the thorny question of 
targets in the international negotiations.  
 
Former Prime Minister John Howard had attempted, in his own 
voluntarist fashion, to bring together China and the US through his 
strong support of nonbinding partnerships with major emerging emitters 
in the developing world, such as the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate 2006, which he defended as a superior 
alternative to the Kyoto Protocol.  Yet while this partnership 
encompasses major emerging emitters such as China and India, along 
with the US, Australia, Japan, South Korea (and, more recently, 
Canada), it lacks targets, timetables and adequate incentives, places no 
price on carbon and is chronically underfunded (Christoff and Eckersley 
2007).    
 
The Rudd government appears to have grasped the fact that firm 
targets, timetables and incentives are the only reliable means by which 
to reduce global aggregate emissions to safe levels in a timely manner.10  
It also has popular support for concerted action during its honeymoon 
period. A Newspoll commissioned by Greenpeace released during the 
Bali negotiations shows 86% of Australians want emissions to decrease 
in the Rudd Labor government’s first term and 77% support a capping 
or phasing out of coal fired power (Newspoll 2007). 
 
One of the biggest flaws of the Kyoto negotiations was the failure to 
develop a fair formula for the allocation of emission targets.  Developing 
countries were partly to blame for this.  In refusing to even broach the 
subject of targets at Kyoto they were unable to shape a debate about a 
fair and transparent formula that might serve their future environment 
and development needs (Najam, Huq and Sokona 2003). The upshot was 
that the developed country targets were negotiated on the basis of 
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political expediency, with each country (or bloc, in the case of the 
European Union) deciding for themselves what they felt they could 
manage.  
 
The IPCC’s recommended target range of 25-40% for developed 
countries leaves open the question of how targets within this range 
should be allocated to specific developed countries.  There is nothing in 
the Action Plan to prevent the same kind of haggling that occurred at 
Kyoto, and no provision that might indicate when developing countries 
might commit to targets.  
  
Yet there is a range of target proposals that are consistent with the 
Convention’s principles that are likely to appeal to developed countries.  
One oft-debated model is Contraction and Convergence, pioneered by 
Aubrey Meyer of the London Global Commons Institute (Meyer 2000).  
Under this model, world aggregate emissions must contract to a safe 
level (say by 80-90%) within an appropriate time (say 2050) in 
accordance with scientific recommendations, and each country’s per 
capita emissions must eventually converge to that safe level.  This 
effectively gives each citizen of the world the right to pollute up to a 
certain safe level.  Countries with high per capita emissions must 
contract, while countries with very low per capita emissions would be 
given room to grow.  The adjustment would be facilitated by global 
emissions trading that would provide a net resource transfer from the 
high per capita emitters to low per capita emitters.  However, many 
developed countries are likely to baulk at the cost of this scheme, which 
also depends on agreement on a timely rate of emissions contraction by 
developed countries and measures to prevent the trading of ‘subsistence 
emissions’ in developing countries.   
 
As an alternative, Australia could support the 25-40% range 
recommended by the IPCC and propose principles for allocation within 
this range based on the UNFCCC’s principles of equity, responsibility 
and capacity.  This proposal could be linked with a scheme for voluntary 
targets for developing countries.  Such a scheme might exempt 
developing countries from sanctions if they under-achieve but provide 
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significant rewards if they are met, with the option of selling their 
carbon credits if they over-achieve.  This could be backed by a formula 
for the graduation of developed countries to Annex 1, also based on 
historical responsibility and capacity or simply GDP.  One such scheme 
is EcoEquity’s Greenhouse Development Rights.11  This model provides 
a threshold for ‘graduation’ to Annex I that safeguards the rights of 
those living in poverty to reach a dignified level of sustainable human 
development.  On this model, Singapore and South Korea would 
graduate to Annex I, while other developing countries would remain 
exempt until they reach the trigger.  
 
Conclusion 
 
None of the above proposals will appeal to the Bush administration but 
they may appeal to the next US administration (especially a Democrat 
one).  In the meantime, Australia is likely to gain diplomatic traction 
with China by pushing for more concerted technology transfer measures 
and more significant funding for the incremental costs of mitigation 
measures and for adaptation to climate change by developing countries, 
perhaps following the model of the multilateral fund established under 
the Montreal Protocol.   
 
Finally, Australia should also seek the integration of mitigation and 
adaptation measures wherever possible, and ensure that climate policy 
forms part of a whole-of-government sustainability policy.  
Domestically, to drive home the costs of inaction, the Rudd government 
could emphasise the importance of protecting the ‘three R’s’: the Reef, 
Rivers and Rural Australia, all of which are under serious threat from 
climate change and are basic to Australia’s economic prosperity, 
environmental well-being and national identity.  Whereas the Howard 
government construed serious action on climate change as a 
fundamental threat to the national interest, the Rudd Labor 
government has the opportunity to reshape the meaning of the national 
interest to encompass long-range and global environmental concerns 
that provide the basis for lasting prosperity. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Only three countries negotiated an increase in emissions: Iceland (10%), Australia 
(8%), and Norway (1%).   
2 Article 3.7 of the Kyoto Protocol provides ‘Those parties included in Annex I for 
whom land-use change and forestry constitute a net source of greenhouse gas 
emissions in 1990 shall include in their 1990 emissions base year or period the 
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by sources minus 
removals by sinks in 1990 from land-use change for the purposes of calculating their 
assigned amount’.  Australia is the only county that benefits from this clause, owing 
to the significant slow-down in the rate of land-clearing in Queensland after the 
baseline year (which was known at the time of the 1997 Kyoto negotiations).  
3 However, the bill also seeks to reduce US emissions to 80% of 1990 levels by 2050.  
See http://www.house.gov/waxman/safeclimate/ (retrieved 16 January 2008). 
4 These principles are contained in Articles 3(1), 4(8) and 4(9) of the UNFCCC. 
5 This loose alliance of non-EU countries has also included Iceland, New Zealand, 
Norway, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.)   
6 India has proposed that developed country assistance for technology transfer to 
developing countries be ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’, which elicited a 
strong rejection from Paula Dobriansky, the Head of the US delegation.   
7 This statement referred back to a press briefing earlier in the week by James 
Connaughton, a key member of the US delegation and head of the President’s 
Council on Environmental Quality, to the effect that the US would lead but it 
required others to follow. 
8 See the Evangelical Environmental Network and Creation Care Magazine 
Homepage, available at http://www.whatwouldjesusdrive.org/ (accessed 16 January 
2008). 
9 See the League of Conservation Voters’ 2008 Presidential Primaries Voter Guide, 
available at http://www.lcv.org/newsroom/press-releases/lcv-releases-2008-
presidential-primaries-voter-guide.html (retrieved 16 January 2008). 
10 The former Howard government had reluctantly conceded this at the national 
level, but not the international level. 
11 See http://www.ecoequity.org/ 
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Planning for a “no regrets” post-Kyoto world 
 
Dr Michael Heazle 
 
 
The Bali negotiations on the framework to replace the Kyoto Protocol 
when it expires in 2012 have been roundly applauded as a success, but in 
reality no major commitments were made. The Roadmap’s biggest 
achievement was an agreement among its participants to try and 
negotiate a replacement for Kyoto over the next couple of years along 
with agreement on some basic guidelines and principles for doing so. But 
the prospects for a comprehensive, binding, and above all effective 
agreement will be severely weakened if governments continue down the 
same road as the Kyoto Protocol by continuing to focus primarily on 
cutting emissions instead of eliminating what produces them. 
Furthermore, governments in developed states need to take the lead in 
both the formulation and implementation of climate change policy at 
home and move beyond their almost slavish faith in the ability of 
market mechanisms and business to provide emission reductions and 
make fossil fuels cleaner. In this essay I argue that the Kyoto model 
should be replaced by an international treaty that reflects a real and 
determined commitment by governments to develop alternative energy 
sources aimed at replacing fossil fuels in the short to medium term. By 
doing so we will not only hedge our bets against the potential effects of 
climate change and our responses to it, we will also be building an 
enduring legacy for future generations. 
 
Reducing Emissions: Uncertain Benefits, Certain Costs 
 
The policy dilemma that governments face in charting a course beyond 
the Kyoto Protocol’s 2012 expiration, is essentially a choice between i) 
accepting economic and political pain today by making substantial 
emission reductions in the hope that doing so will significantly reduce 
the unknown costs of global warming in the future; ii) adopting a mostly 
business as usual approach in the hope that the scientists predicting 
worse case scenarios have got it wrong (for example, the Howard 
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government’s Asia Pacific Partnership initiative); or, iii) finding an 
alternative approach that hedges our bets against the many 
uncertainties we face over various future outcomes. The stakes are high, 
as are the associated uncertainties. But because the stakes are so high, it 
is imperative that we do not make the error of confusing consensus with 
certainty or scepticism with politically motivated contrarianism in the 
course of debating appropriate policy responses to climate change. A 
clue to how we might avoid such mistakes is provided by Bertrand 
Russell’s support for a middle position on scepticism. In Sceptical Essays 
(1935), he wrote that: 
 
‘even when the experts all agree, they may well be mistaken. All 
experts would have rejected Einstein’s view as to the magnitude of the 
deflection of light by gravitation twenty years ago, yet it proved to be 
right. Nevertheless the opinion of experts, when it is unanimous, must 
be accepted by non-experts as more likely to be right than the opposite 
opinion12 [my emphasis].’ 
 
The problem, of course, is that expert opinion is very seldom unanimous 
as the various ongoing global warming debates demonstrate. Indeed, the 
more important the issue and the greater the political and economic 
costs involved, the less likely unanimity becomes. The best that can be 
hoped for with specialist advice then, whether it be scientific or 
otherwise, is a simple majority consensus, which is a good deal less 
comforting than unanimous opinion when important decisions need to 
be made. In this situation, Russell advised ‘that when they [the experts] 
are not agreed, no opinion can be regarded as certain by a non-expert’.13  
 
Contrary to media claims and the public assertions of some scientists, 
uncertainties over the causes and especially the potential impacts of 
climate change are plentiful and cannot be dismissed in any serious 
treatment of the contemporary global climate change debate. 
Supporters of the mainstream, human-induced global warming view are 
able to cite climate change facts that are largely uncontested, such as 
increased greenhouse gas (GHG) levels in the atmosphere and a general 
warming trend in global temperatures over the last 150 years – a period 
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of warming weather some scientists have argued is not surprising since it 
begins at the end of a mini-ice age period that began in the 1300s. 
Furthermore, there is broad agreement and very strong evidence to 
support both the observed warming trend and the assertion that carbon 
dioxide levels in the atmosphere are now higher than pre-industrial 
levels.  
 
However, the extent to which these facts are causally related, as opposed 
to whether they are related, is in dispute as is, therefore, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assertion that it is 
‘likely’ that increasing global temperatures are the result of human 
activity.14 Controversies such as the long running and increasingly 
acrimonious ‘hockey stick’ graph debate15 (a graph used to great effect 
by the IPCC in its 2001 report to support its finding that higher 
greenhouse gas levels are causing higher temperatures), for example, 
serve to demonstrate that claims of a scientific consensus on even global 
warming’s current causes are problematic. Doubts over the current 
warming trend’s exact causes, however, pale in contrast to the 
inscrutability of what the future impacts of a warming climate actually 
will be. What, for example, is acceptance or rejection of the various 
global warming scenarios (the IPCC has produced some forty ‘scenarios’, 
not ‘predictions’), which range from minor to catastrophic climate 
change consequences, based upon? More importantly, how does our 
confidence in such scenarios actually occurring stack up against the costs 
of taking precautions today against the possible (but unknown) costs of 
global warming tomorrow?   
 
And therein lies the rub: even if everyone accepted human induced ‘global 
warming’ as the most compelling explanation for what is happening 
today, we would be no closer to understanding what global warming 
means in terms of what will happen tomorrow. And even if the IPCC 
were able to narrow its currently broad range of future temperature 
increases and predict future consequences with a “high degree” of 
certainty, the ‘science’ of climate change would still be unable to tell 
policy makers what they should do about it in terms of effective policy. 
The business of determining policy responses to climate change impacts, 
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for mitigation and adaptation strategies alike, is an entirely political 
process that must manage competing values, choices, and preferences. 
And although the IPCC leadership often appears to think otherwise, 
policy advocacy is beyond the realm of scientific expertise. While most 
physical scientists no doubt believe their task to be about uncovering 
the realities of the natural world, policy is about the reality of what is 
acceptable and therefore achievable in the political world.  
 
The extent to which climate-related impacts on human society are 
entirely, or even mostly, the result of greenhouse gas increases caused by 
human activity may never be entirely clear. The role of natural climate 
variation, the impact of aerosols, water vapour, clouds, and sun spots, in 
addition to the causes and effects of naturally generated methane, to 
name but a few areas of concern, have all raised questions that scientists 
and their climate models remain unable to unequivocally answer or 
account for. The central policy question then should not be all about 
who has got it right; we should also be thinking about how we can 
develop a strategy that best manages the risks involved with getting the 
causes and potential effects of climate change wrong, at least until we 
are in a position to more confidently discuss what is or isn’t going to 
happen.16  
 
Another emerging problem is that even if we do accept the current 
consensus on the causes and possible impacts of global warming, there is 
little agreement among those who otherwise generally concur with the 
human induced global warming theory over the kinds of carbon emission 
reductions needed to reduce future increases in temperature; some 
warming and GHG retention rate estimates and impact assessments 
indicate that nothing short of major short term reductions will be 
effective. One such study appeared in New Scientist in February 2005,17 
with the report adding that the European Union’s target of limiting 
global warming to 2 degrees Celsius ‘now appears wildly optimistic’. The 
study claims that if GHGs are to reach ‘safe levels’, current global 
emissions need to fall to between 30-50% of 1990 levels by 2050 (the 
Kyoto Protocol aims to reduce the collective GHG emissions of 
industrialised countries by 5.2% compared to 1990 levels by 2012).  If 
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such studies are reliable (and again, who knows?), the economic and 
political costs of trying to avoid the worst of global warming are looking 
more and more likely to be so great as to be unacceptable to all but the 
most devout environmentalists; most people in either developed or 
developing societies quite simply could not or would not tolerate the 
serious economic effects that major, short term emission reductions 
would involve. And given the myriad uncertainties that characterise our 
understanding of the global climate and the effects of our interaction 
with it,18 it is difficult to argue that people, especially in developing 
countries, should nonetheless accept significant economic cost and 
hardship today – despite the Stern Report’s relatively optimistic 
assessment on this point19 – in order to limit only one of the many 
variables that may or may not be behind climate change. 
 
An Alternative Roadmap 
 
A far more appropriate response to climate change, therefore, and the 
threats it may or may not involve, is to directly address the suspected 
cause, fossil fuel use, rather than the effect it produces: increasing GHG 
emissions. Thus, policy should aim to replace fossil fuels with a more 
diverse and cleaner array of renewable energy sources as quickly as 
possible, as opposed to trying to figure out ways to limit fossil fuel use 
and make it cleaner, which is the main goal of current mitigation 
thinking. Doing so not only would greatly reduce human GHG emissions 
but would also, with a relatively high degree of certainty, provide a host 
of additional benefits that could still be enjoyed even if our current 
assessments of global warming’s causes and the severity of its impacts 
turn out to be wrong.  
 
Adopting such an approach, often referred to as a ‘no regrets’ approach 
to risk and uncertainty, is entirely compatible with the decisions taken 
for the Bali Roadmap and would require all of the same provisions 
concerning technology transfer, funding, and monitoring. Moreover, 
making the phase out and replacement of fossil fuels the main goal of 
mitigation would produce additional benefits by making the monitoring 
of compliance and transfers far less complex. A strategy for drastically 
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reducing oil and coal reliance over the next twenty years, for example, 
would require replacing them with readily available, and cleaner, short 
term alternatives like natural gas, but would also provide immediate 
opportunities for other, longer term alternatives already in use such as 
hydro-electric, wind, geo-thermal, and solar while boosting their 
development. Nuclear power could remain as an additional option, but 
only where absolutely necessary due to the huge investment (and risks) 
involved with building, running, and dismantling reactors, given their 
relatively short operating life.  
 
Indeed, the possibility that GHG emissions are the major cause of global 
warming – as ‘likely’ as this may or may not be – should stand as only 
one of several other equally compelling reasons for pursuing an 
accelerated shift way from fossil fuel reliance. Aside from the obvious 
environmental and health impacts of fossil fuel use, oil in particular 
poses major challenges for developing and developed economies alike. In 
addition to the economic burden imposed by escalating oil prices, some 
examples of the risks and problems posed by its future scarcity include 
higher levels of exposure among developing economies to energy price 
rises (as the fall of the Suharto government demonstrated following the 
1997 Asian financial crisis); increasing energy competition between 
states; financial and political support for dictatorial/authoritarian, and 
often hugely dysfunctional regimes in resource rich states as has 
occurred with China’s ‘aid for energy deals’ in Burma, Sudan, and 
elsewhere; and, further nuclear proliferation and weakening of the Non 
Proliferation Treaty. 
 
Thus, it is a mistake to be focusing on emission reductions, as the Kyoto 
Protocol and most of the global warming debate do, since there are far 
too many uncertainties and risks, known or unknown, involved for us to 
act with any reasonable degree of confidence in identifying and then 
selecting the risks we prefer to face or avoid. Supporters of the 
mainstream global warming view often argue that future generations 
will never forgive us if we fail to act against the future consequences. 
That is no doubt true, but this argument assumes that we know what 
the consequences are (which we don’t) and also neglects the possibility 
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that drastic action today – on the basis of little more than untestable 
assumptions about the future – may also have consequences that our 
great grandchildren will find equally difficult to forgive, such as 
development failures and worsening poverty, the neglect of other 
pressing environmental and social issues, and a heightened risk of 
military conflict.  
 
Critics of the Kyoto Protocol, and the less than ‘politically neutral’ 
advice of the IPCC, have got it right when they argue that its strategies 
are undermined by i) too many questionable assumptions in relation to 
the likely costs involved; and ii) division, among even those who support 
the global warming consensus, over how effective, if at all, the Protocol’s 
reductions would be even if full international co-operation and 
implementation were possible (which it isn’t). Prominent among such 
critics, unfortunately, are those who have preferred to use the Kyoto 
Protocol’s shortcomings and division over its future course as a political 
foil for having no climate change strategy rather than as grounds for 
developing an effective alternative.   
 
At the inaugural meeting of the six member Asia Pacific Partnership 
group (AP6) in January 2006, the Kyoto Protocol’s two biggest and 
most powerful critics at the time, US President George W. Bush and 
then Australian Prime Minister John Howard, talked up the importance 
of developing renewable energy sources as a way of combating global 
warming threats without incurring potentially crippling economic 
penalties.  As is so often the case, however, their actions failed to do 
their words justice. Prime Minister Howard, for example, also made it 
quite clear that the Australian government remained committed to fossil 
fuels, calling them ‘an enduring reality for our lifetime and beyond’.  
 
According to figures reported in The Australian,20 of the A$100 million 
dollars Howard dedicated to the partnership over five years, Australia 
would contribute a paltry A$5 million dollars per year to developing 
renewable energy projects. This, according to a government AP6 press 
release,21 is in addition to the A$200 million the Howard government 
claimed it already had invested in developing renewable energy (A$500 
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million meanwhile has been ‘invested’ in so-called ‘low emission 
technologies’). For its part, the US government, which spends more than 
US$350 billion on its military each year, committed a meagre US$52 
million from its 2007 budget, subject to approval by Congress 
(‘expected’ to grow to US$260 million by 2011). Both the Howard and 
Bush governments essentially used the AP6 as a cover for dodging the 
global warming issue entirely by announcing their intention to hand the 
job of developing and implementing new energy technology over to the 
private sector. And like the Kyoto Protocol, the AP6 was largely a 
calculated exercise in symbolism over substance – a disguise for 
effectively doing little more than using climate change as a promotional 
opportunity for free market ideology and passing the policy buck. 
 
The Rudd government, meanwhile, is yet to articulate a clear position 
on the future of fossil fuels in Australia, and is unlikely to do so anytime 
soon, given the political and economic weight of the coal and oil 
industries here. So far Labor has been strong on global warming 
rhetoric, but most of the statements came while still in opposition; we 
are yet to see any firm commitments and strategy, particular in relation 
to the further development of alternative energy sources, now that Mr 
Rudd is prime minister. The Bush administration, for its part, 
reluctantly got on board in Bali, which probably says more about the 
open-ended nature of the Bali Roadmap than it does about any change 
of heart in Washington, and like Australia the US position on future 
negotiations remains unclear. 
 
 
Dr. Michael Heazle is an ARC Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia 
Institute, Griffith University. 
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NOTES 
 
1Bertrand Russell, Sceptical Essays (London: Unwin, 1977), p. 12. 
2 Ibid. 
3 See the 2007 ‘Summary for Policymakers’ from the Working Group I contribution 
to the Fourth Assessment Report of The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
p. 9. 
4 The ‘frontline’ of the hockey stick debate where many of the scientific claims and 
counter claims over the extent to which current warming is exceptional can be 
found on the following websites, Realclimate.org and Climateaudit.org. A balanced 
perspective on the hockey stick claims and other climate change debates can be 
found at Prometheus (http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu); See also Fred Pearce, 
‘Climate Change: Menace or Myth.’, New Scientist, February 12, 2005. 
http://environment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/climatechange/mg18524861.400 
5 Research published in Nature further illustrates the likelihood of knowledge 
suddenly morphing into questionable assumptions. Four Europe-based scientists 
now have concluded that, contrary to conventional scientific wisdom, large amounts 
of methane (an important GHG) are produced by living – instead of decaying as had 
previously been assumed – terrestrial vegetation, such as trees. As all good research 
should, this study both questions what we think we already know and raises new 
questions that we haven’t previously thought about. One of the questions it raises 
in the context of global warming is the usefulness of mitigating carbon emissions by 
using forests and reforestation projects as ‘carbon sinks’, one of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s major initiatives, since it is now possible that forests are contributing 
rather than only absorbing GHGs. See David C. Lowe, ‘A green source of surprise’, 
Nature, vol. 439, no. 12, January 12, 2006, pp. 148-49. 
6 Jenny Hogan, ‘Only huge emission cuts will curb climate change’, New 
Scientist.com, February 3, 2005, 
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn6964&print=true 
7 Not to mention our inability to know what either the global climate or we might be 
doing in fifty or one hundred years time. 
8 See for example, Roger Pielke Jnr,  ‘Stern’s Cherry Picking on Disasters and 
Climate Change’, Prometheus, October 30, 2006, 
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/climate_change/000973sterns
_cherry_picki.html 
9 ‘Ferguson splits left on Kyoto’, The Australian, January 13, 2006, 
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/0,5942,17808347,00.html 
10Joint Australian Federal Government press Release, ‘Asia Pacific Partnership Sets 
New Path To Address Climate Change’, January 12, 2006, 
http://www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases/media_Release1743.html 
